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 five of fifteen Supreme Court nominees had been federal appeals court judges.
 (Such nominees were even scarcer prior to 1945.) Since then, sixteen of nineteen
 nominees have had federal appellate experience. Federal appeals judges have
 become "the 'darlings' of the selection process in modern times," according to
 Yalof (p. 170). Presidents prefer them because their appellate opinions offer
 insights into their judicial philosophies. In addition, appellate judges "also make
 for less controversial nominees before the U.S. Senate" because they have already
 been confirmed by the Senate at least once and have survived reviews by the
 Federal Bureau of Investigation and the American Bar Association (p. 171).
 Curiously, Yalof pays no attention to the partisan aspects of his three models
 of judicial selection. Yet a pattern seems to exist. Of the five nominees chosen
 through an open process, four were picked by Democratic presidents. Democrats
 also selected six of the nine single-candidate nominees. In contrast, all fourteen
 products of the criteria-driven process were nominated by Republican presidents.
 An alternative explanation of this pattern, of course, is that it is temporal rather
 than partisan: of the fifteen nominations between 1945 and 1968, only three were
 criteria-driven, while of the thirteen nominations between 1969 and 1987, eleven
 were. Evidence that the partisan interpretation is the more accurate one, however,
 may be found in the nominations made by Bush and Clinton. In Yalof's provision-
 al assessment, the Republican Bush used a criteria-driven process in making both
 of his nominations. The Democrat Clinton used an open process for both of his.
 MICHAEL NELSON
 Rhodes College
 GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, Commodity and Propriety: Competing Visions of
 Property in American Legal Thought, 1776-1970. Chicago: University of
 Chicago Press, 1997. x, 486 pp. $39.95.
 In this impressive volume, Gregory Alexander analyzes property in American
 legal thought as a dialectic between conceptions of commodity and propriety. As
 commodity, property's primary purpose is to enable individuals to satisfy their
 personal preferences. Law maximizes social wealth (and ultimately individual sat-
 isfaction) when it allows those preferences to be freely expressed in the market-
 place. As propriety, property's primary purpose is "the material foundation for cre-
 ating and maintaining the proper social order" (p. 1). Property as propriety rejects
 the subjectivity of value undergirding property as commodity. For example, prop-
 erty as commodity privileges freedom of disposition and exchange to satisfy indi-
 vidual preferences. However, property as propriety "is always committed to some
 particular substantive view" (p. 3) from whose perspective property legitimately
 prohibits the satisfaction of preferences. Moreover, propriety and commodity can-
 not collapse into each other. A proprietarian defense of the social order resulting
 from unimpeded market transactions would have to provide a justification besides
 the mere increase in social wealth or satisfaction of individual preferences.
 Alexander rightly appreciates that he is working with very broad conceptions
 that function largely as ideal types since "few, if any, American legal writers were
 consistently and exclusively committed to one or the other" (p. 3). His narrative
 recounts progressive accommodation of inconsistent visions that lawyers did not
 necessarily perceive in competition. Jefferson, for example, was proprietarian
 when he urged widespread agricultural holdings to secure the economic
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 independence necessary to allow citizens to practice virtuous self-governing. Yet,
 Jefferson failed to reject property as commodity. He relied upon symbolic attacks
 on primogeniture and entail as the civic republican program of property "reform"
 instead of considering public restraints on freedom of disposition. Restrictions
 upon market exchanges and donative transfers were necessary to prevent real
 estate speculation and dynastic holdings from undermining property's primary
 role in securing ordinary citizens' economic independence.
 Meanwhile Hamilton, although more responsible than any other American
 before him for developing property as commodity, was also proprietarian since he
 redefined virtue as consistent with, rather than opposed to, self-interest. In an
 environment where secure public debt securities functioned as capital, he argued,
 unleashing individual ambition, creativity, and innovation would create a
 commercial elite whose virtue lay in talent and accomplishment. Freed from the
 feudal vestiges of English property law, which fostered hierarchical economic
 dependency and an aristocracy of wealth rather than talent, Hamilton's commer-
 cial meritocracy would, like Jefferson's agrarian republic, reward virtue--differ-
 ently conceived-rather than wealth per se.
 From this overall perspective, the book dissects the visions of property held
 by exemplary legal thinkers during the ages of American property law identified
 as civic republican (1776-1800), commercial republican (1800-1860), industrial
 (1870-1917), and late modern (1917-1970). Each period's discussion begins with
 a prologue about its characteristic legal writing. The prologues provide context for
 the sources on which the book relies to trace evolving property discourse. Rarely
 does that discourse unambiguously translate into decisions on concrete property
 issues, but it sheds new light on how legal thinkers conceived the connection
 between those issues and normative conceptions of property. The book treats the
 reader to subtle and original analyses of such luminaries as James Kent, John
 Chipman Gray, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Morris Cohen and Robert L. Hale, which
 illustrate important themes in lawyers' evolving property theory.
 The explanatory framework provided by the dialectic between propriety and
 commodity, however, is more problematic than the book's compelling analyses of
 more particular property theories employed in exemplary works of legal scholar-
 ship and in public debates over concrete property issues. The argument is in con-
 stant danger of falling victim to the book's appreciation of the nuances of the his-
 torical texts because the categories appear so malleable that shifts within each
 approach threaten to overwhelm the significance of affinities between proprietari-
 an or commodificationist approaches. Alexander appreciates the potential prob-
 lem. He characterizes the commodificationist approach as essentially "empty" (p.
 3), since very different property regimes may satisfy its criteria. Meanwhile, that
 proprietarian approaches may reject values' subjectivity hardly means that they
 agree on the values that property law ought to protect. Uncovering proprietarian
 strands in lawyers' property theory emphasizes similarly between justifications of
 such disparate policies as slavery, strict limitations on inheritance, paternalist lim-
 its to married women's property rights, constitutional protection of welfare entitle-
 ments, permission of spendthrift trusts, elimination of spendthrift trusts, broad
 constitutional protection of vested rights, and narrow constitutional protection of
 vested rights.
 Consequently, the historical significance of the opposition between commod-
 ity and propriety is broader than its role in any particular theory or policy debate.
 Alexander offers his account to correct those who portray property's consistent
 role as protecting the market from democratic attempts to use property law in aid
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 of the proper social order. In this, the book is successful. Although property as
 propriety explains only the broadest outlines of how legal thinkers identified
 legitimate goals of property law, it successfully rebuts the claim that Americans'
 historical commitment to property comprises the belief that wealth creation and
 individual preference satisfaction are its only legitimate goals.
 That American property law has not been exclusively concerned with facili-
 tating the market, however, does not necessarily support Alexander's normative
 claim for the significance of the propriety/commodity dichotomy. He argues that
 modem, economic libertarian conceptions of property represent an unprecedented
 rejection of the historical dialectic because they entirely forsake the proprietarian
 tradition. As exemplars, Alexander identifies Friedrich Hayek and Justice Scalia's
 Lucas opinion, one of several recent Supreme Court decisions resurrecting mori-
 bund federal constitutional protection for property. Nevertheless, the book does
 not show that their views are necessarily any more lacking in subtle proprietarian
 influence than those of previous jurists whose property jurisprudence economic
 theory and fear of majoritarian restrictions on liberty also shaped. Hayek' s defense
 of the market, for instance, was partly moral, and the book does not adequately
 explain how he forsakes proprietarianism while Hamilton, who conceived of the
 market as rewarding entrepreneurial virtue, merely transformed it. Similarly, the
 book does not undertake to explain how Justice Scalia's resurrection of constitu-
 tional protection of property reflects a completely commodified view. So one
 cannot tell how Justice Field's defense of similar constitutional protection, which
 justified market outcomes partly as an alternative to economic dependence upon
 government, is importantly different from Scalia's. That is not to say that
 Alexander cannot make the case, but one must be careful to recall that even
 Milton Friedman grounded his defense of free markets in their relationship to
 political freedom and not merely in their ability to generate wealth.
 Although not yet proved, Alexander's normative thesis is bound to have an
 impact upon property scholarship. It challenges the existing wisdom that modem
 constitutional protection of property rights is vulnerable since it is similar to late
 nineteenth and early twentieth century substantive due process. Alexander poten-
 tially turns that wisdom on its head by suggesting that the Court's resurrection of
 property rights' protection is vulnerable for precisely the opposite reason; its
 break from proprietarian ideas still alive within "Lochnerism" undermines its his-
 torical legitimacy. To prove that challenging thesis, however, Alexander must for-
 tify the boundary between propriety and commodity. If a fully commodified con-
 ception of property is empty because equally consistent with profoundly different
 markets, every attempt to use commodity to support particular property rules has
 to rely, at least implicitly, on assumptions about the proper social order that do not
 follow merely from the goals of wealth creation or preference satisfaction. As
 even fully commodified conceptions make implicit concessions to propriety when
 promoting particular property rules, Alexander must further explain their depar-
 ture from earlier visions.
 Sharpening the distinction between commodity and propriety also requires
 comparing those descriptive categories with others rooted in historical changes
 within economic conceptions of property. The emptiness of the wholly commodi-
 fied conception of property is an artifact of the marginalist revolution in economic
 thought and the transition from the classical to the neoclassical paradigm. The lat-
 ter sharply distinguishes between allocation efficiency and wealth distribution. It
 concedes that efficiency analysis presupposes, but cannot itself justify, a distribu-
 tional starting point defined by property entitlements. The neoclassical paradigm
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 enables discourse about fully commodified property by abandoning any sense of a
 proper social order besides that suggested by maximization of wealth and individ-
 ual satisfaction. Still, it does so only by acknowledging its limits as a normative
 framework for evaluating property's distribution. The neoclassical paradigm rep-
 resents a shift within economic thought away from the classical paradigm in
 which market outcomes were not merely efficient, but also just because they
 rewarded people for the "true" commercial value of their labor. However, there is
 no break from tradition in lawyers' borrowing ideas about property from prevail-
 ing economic paradigms. Lawyers whose economic assumptions required no
 choice between wealth creation, individual satisfaction, and the material founda-
 tion for the social order could not have viewed the distributive consequences of
 those assumptions as embodying concessions to propriety.
 It remains to be seen, therefore, whether Alexander's demonstration that the
 proprietarian conception of property is part of our historical discourse supports its
 overt revival. Those who advocate a commodified view may properly understand
 that their progenitors were partial proprietarians only by virtue of earlier economic
 paradigms' limitations. Nonetheless, the book requires modem commodification-
 ists to confront proprietarian discourse when considering their view's historical
 legitimacy. Reminded that earlier commodificationists considered property from a
 normative perspective that allocational efficiency alone cannot support, their mod-
 em counterparts should confront the limitations of their own perspective. Surely
 today's lawyers who conceive of property as commodity are apt to forget or deny
 that claims about property's efficient allocation presuppose, rather than justify,
 property's pre-existing distribution.
 Even if the book does not provoke lawyers to appreciate the limits of modem
 economic analysis, it will have a profound effect. By asking whether Americans
 have been content to conceive property as mere commodity, subjecting the materi-
 al foundation for the proper social order to the agnosticism of the marketplace,
 Commodity and Propriety establishes an important agenda for property scholar-
 ship. Moreover, by tracing the view that "the purpose of property is not to satisfy
 individual preferences or to increase wealth but to fulfill some prior normative
 vision of how society and the polity that governs it should be structured" (p. 2),
 the book outlines an important alternative that legal historians ignore at their peril.
 JAMES L. KAINEN
 Fordham University School of Law
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